Formal Models of Timing Attacks on Web Privacy1
		1Research partially supported by MURST Progetto Cofinanziato TOSCA.  by Focardi, Riccardo et al.
p ( )
URL: http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/entcs/volume62.html 15 pages
Formal Models of Timing Attacks on Web
Privacy 1
Riccardo Focardi a, Roberto Gorrieri b, Ruggero Lanotte c,
Andrea Maggiolo-Schettini c, Fabio Martinelli d, Simone Tini e,
Enrico Tronci f
a Dipartimento di Matematica Applicata e Informatica, Universita` di Venezia, Via
Torino 155, 30173 Mestre, Italy
b Dipartimento di Scienze dell’Informazione, Universita` di Bologna, Mura Anteo
Zamboni 7, 40127 Bologna, Italy
c Dipartimento di Informatica, Universita` di Pisa, Corso Italia 40, 56125 Pisa,
Italy
d Istituto per le Applicazioni Telematiche, C.N.R. di Pisa, Via Giuseppe Moruzzi
1, 56124 Pisa, Italy
e Dipartimento di Scienze CC.FF.MM., Universita` dell’Insubria, Via Valleggio 11,
22100, Como, Italy
f Dipartimento di Informatica, Universita` di L’Aquila, Via Vetoio, Coppito, 67100
L’Aquila, Italy
Abstract
We model a timing attack on web privacy proposed by Felten and Schneider by using
three diﬀerent approaches: HL-Timed Automata, SMV model checker, and tSPA
Process Algebra. Some comparative analysis on the three approaches is derived.
1 Introduction
One of the main requirements of mobile code is that it must guarantee some
kind of security to clients executing it. One of the security requirements is the
client’s privacy, namely that executing mobile code does not imply leaking of
private information.
Several papers (see, among the others, [4,5,6,9,10]) dealing with privacy,
consider two-level systems, where the high level (or secret) behavior is dis-
tinguished from the low level (or observable) one. In the mentioned papers,
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systems respect the property of privacy if there is no information ﬂow from
the high level to the low level. This means that the secret behavior cannot in-
ﬂuence the observable one, or, equivalently, no information on the observable
behavior permits to infer information on the secret one.
In this paper we consider the timing attack on web privacy described in
[3]. The attack compromises the privacy of user’s web-browsing histories by
allowing a malicious web site to determine whether or not the user has recently
visited some other, unrelated, web page w. A Java applet is embedded in the
malicious web site and is run by the user’s browser. The applet ﬁrst performs
a request to a ﬁle of w, and then performs a new request to the malicious site.
So, the malicious site can measure the time elapsed between the two requests
which it receives from the user, and, if such a time is under a certain bound,
it infers that w was in the cache of the browser of the user, thus implying
that w has been recently visited by the user. The system has two levels: the
malicious site can observe its interactions with the user, but it cannot observe
the interactions between the user, the cache and the web site w.
We analyze the attack with three approaches. In Sect. 2 we use HL-Timed
Automata [7], and we consider dense time temporal behaviors. In Sect. 3 and
4 we use SMV [8,2,11] and tSPA [6], respectively, and we consider discrete
time temporal behaviors. Finally, in Sect. 5 we draw some conclusions.
2 The HL-Timed Automata approach
The formalism of HL-Timed Automata [7] is an extension of Alur and Dill’s
Timed Automata [1] suitable to model two-level systems. HL-Timed Au-
tomata are Timed Automata with two additional features:
• The alphabet of symbols recognized by an automaton consists of two sets:
the set H of high symbols and the set L of low symbols.
• Automata can run in parallel and are perfectly synchronized, meaning that
automata running in parallel can advance only by recognizing the same
symbol at the same instant of time.
In Fig. 1 we model the web attack problem with HL-Timed Automata.
Automaton Ac represents the cache. The time elapsed between a request rc
and an answer ac is in the interval [2, 5] (in fact, clock x is reset when the
cache receives rc, and it is required that x is in [2, 5] when the cache gives the
answer ac). Automaton Aw represents the site w. The time elapsed between a
request rw and an answer aw is in the interval [100, 250]. The automaton Au
represents the requests by the user that downloads the page of the malicious
site. First of all, it performs a request re to the malicious site. Then, when
it receives the answer ae, it performs a communication either with the cache
or with the site w. Finally, it performs another request re and it waits for an
answer from the malicious site.
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Fig. 1. The web system.
Now, the only visible symbols for the malicious site are re and ae, since the
malicious site can observe neither interaction between the user and the cache,
nor interaction between the user and the web page w. So, L = {re, ae} and
H = {rc, ac, rw, aw}. Moreover, to synchronize the automata, we assume that
there are transitions from state c1 to state c1 labeled with symbols re, ae, rw
and aw, and that there are transitions from state s1 to state s1 labeled with
symbols re, ae, rc and ac.
Formally, given sets of high symbols H and low symbols L, a HL-Timed
Automaton is a tuple A = ((L,H), A1, . . . , Am), where, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
Ai = (Qi, q
0
i , δi, Xi) is a sequential automaton, with:
• a ﬁnite set of states Qi
• an initial state q0i ∈ Qi
• a set of clocks Xi
• a set of transitions δi ⊆ Qi × Φ(Xi)× (L ∪H)× 2Xi ×Qi, where Φ(Xi) is
the set of constraints over the set of clocks Xi that are generated by the
following grammar:
φ ::= x#c |φ ∧ φ |φ ∨ φ | ¬φ | true ,
where # ∈ {<,≤, >,≥,=, =}, and where c is a constant.
The sets of clocks X1, . . . , Xm are pairwise disjoint.
Intuitively, a transition (q, φ, a, Y, q′) of an automaton Ai can ﬁre when
state q is active, symbol a is recognized and clocks satisfy the clock constraint
φ. In such a case, state q′ is entered and the clocks in Y are reset. Moreover,
it is required that automata A1, . . . , Am are synchronized, meaning that they
can advance only when all of them can read a given symbol in H ∪ L.
The HL-Timed Automaton A recognizes timed words ω = (ω1, ω2) such
that ω1 : N → (L ∪ H) and ω2 : N → T , with T a time domain. Intu-
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itively, ω describes the behavior of a system that performs action ω1(i) at time∑i
h=0 ω2(h). We denote with ωL the projection of ω on L, namely the (possibly
ﬁnite) sequence (ω1(i1),
∑i1
h=0 ω2(h)), (ω1(i2),
∑i2
h=i1+1
ω2(h)), . . . such that, for
each index ij, ω1(ij) ∈ L and, for each ij < k < ij+1, ω1(k) ∈ H. The se-
quence ωL describes the observable part of ω. Moreover, we denote with Fω
the function that gives the index in ω of the low action in position j in ωL,
namely Fω(j) = ij.
The language accepted by A (denoted by L(A)) is the set of timed words
recognized by A.
We refer to [7] for a formal deﬁnition of the behavior of HL-Timed Au-
tomata.
2.1 The No-privacy Property
Given sequences d and d′, let d ≤P d′ denote the fact that d is a preﬁx of d′.
Let a ∈ H, d be a ﬁnite sequence (a1, t1), . . . , (ah, th) with a1, . . . , ah ∈ L
and t1, . . . , th ∈ T , and i be an index 1 ≤ i < h. We deﬁne the No− privacy
property NPr(d, i, a) for a HL-Timed Automaton A as follows:
for each ω ∈ L(A), d ≤P ωL implies a ∈ {ω1(Fω(i)+1), . . . , ω1(Fω(i+1)−1)}.
Intuitively, NPr(d, i, a) expresses that, whenever the sequence d of low symbols
is read, the high symbol a is read between the low level actions ai and ai+1,
and, therefore, there is an information ﬂow from high level to low level, namely
information on the secret behavior can be inferred from information on the
observable behavior.
2.2 Checking No-Privacy
In [7] it is proved that the property NPr(d, i, a) is decidable.
More precisely, an algorithm is given which takes an HL-Timed Automaton
A and a property NPr(d, i, a), and checks whether NPr(d, i, a) holds or not.
The algorithm exploits the region graph [1] ofA and simulates all the behaviors
of A whose observable preﬁx is described by d.
The algorithm is linear w.r.t. the size of the region graph, which, in turn,
is exponential in size w.r.t. the size of the automaton.
Now, if we consider the observable sequence d = (re, 10)(ae, 20)(re, 40),
then NPr(d, 2, ac) holds. This means that whenever the two requests from
the user to the malicious site are separated by 30 units of time, the malicious
site is sure that the web page w is in the cache of the user.
On the contrary, if we take d = (re, 10)(ae, 20)(re, 200), then NPr(d, 2, ac)
does not hold, since the delay of 190 units of time between the two requests
from the user can be due either to the communication between the user and
the malicious site, or to the communication between the user and w.
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-- Cache
INIT
Ac = 1 & x = 0
TRANS
((Ac = 1) & (!(act = r_c)) & (next(Ac) = 1) & (next(x) = 0)) |
((Ac = 1) & (act = r_c) & (next(Ac) = 2) & (next(act) = nop) &
(next(x) = 1)) |
((Ac = 2) & (act = nop) & (x < 5) & (next(Ac) = 2) & (next(act) = nop) &
(next(x) = x + 1)) | -- idle
((Ac = 2) & (act = nop) & (x >= 2) & (next(Ac) = 1) & (next(act) = a_c) &
(next(x) = 0))
Fig. 2. Cache automaton
3 The SMV approach
In this section we show how the model checker SMV [8,2,11] can be used
to automatically verify the No-privacy property as deﬁned in the previous
section. Since SMV only handles ﬁnite state systems, we use a discrete time
model rather than the continuous time model of Timed Automata.
3.1 Basic notation
Here we shortly describe the SMV frame. We refer to [2] for more details.
In SMV we can deﬁne a process (i.e. a Finite State System, FSS) with its
transition relation. Thus for each process P we have a boolean function (also
named P ) deﬁning the transition relation of P . We use C-like identiﬁers to
denote arrays of boolean variables ranging on P present states. We use (′) to
denote the next state operator. Thus, e.g. if x ranges on P present states
then x′ ranges on P next states. The boolean expression P (x,x′) deﬁnes the
transition relation of process P . Since P (x,x′) univocally deﬁnes a process
we will also use P (x,x′) as a name for P .
We use synchronous parallel process composition. Thus given processes
P (x,x′) and Q(x,x′) their composition is represented by the process R(x,x′)
= P (x,x′) ∧Q(x,x′).
We will freely use arithmetic operators in our boolean expressions. They
can be translated into boolean operators as in an ALU.
The set of initial states of a process can be deﬁned with a boolean function
returning 1 (true) on the set of initial states.
SMV comment lines start with --. SMV keyword MODULE is followed by
the module name. Module main must always be present. Keyword VAR is
followed by the list of the module variables together with their (ﬁnite) ranges.
SMV uses the symbol “&” for the boolean “and” (∧), the symbol “|” for the
boolean “or” (∨) and the symbol “!” for the boolean “not” (¬).
In Fig. 2 we specify using SMV the cache automaton of ﬁg. 2.
Keyword INIT is followed by the boolean expression deﬁning the set of
initial states. (It requires that automaton state 1 is active and clock x equals
0.) Keyword TRANS is followed by the boolean expression deﬁning the transi-
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tion relation. (It relates the current automaton state (Ac), action performed
(act) and clock value (x) with the next automaton state, action performed
and clock value.) Note that SMV next state operator (′) is denoted by next.
3.2 The No-privacy Property
Let P (x, a,x′, a′) be an FSS, with L ∪ H the range of a. Let I(x, a) be the
(boolean expression deﬁning the) set of initial states for P . An (I, P ) sequence
for P is a sequence of states (x0, a0), (x1, a1), . . . such that: I(x0, a0) = 1 and
for all i = 0, 1, . . . P (xi, ai,xi+1, ai+1) = 1. An (I, P ) sequence can be ﬁnite
as well as inﬁnite.
Let ω be an (I, P ) sequence for P . We denote with ωL the projection of
ω on L. That is ωL = <ω(i0), ω(i1), . . .>, where for each index ij, ω(ij) ∈ L
and for each ij < k < ij+1, ω(k) ∈ H. We denote with Fω the function that
gives the index in ω of the low action in position j in ωL, namely Fω(j) = ij.
An (a, L) spy sequence of length n for P is a sequence <a0, [t
0
min, t
0
max),
a1, [t
1
min, t
1
max), . . . an−1, [t
n−1
min, t
n−1
max), an>, where: 1. for all i = 0, . . . n,
ai ∈ L; 2. for all i = 0, . . . n − 1, timin, timax are non-negative integers; 3. for
all i = 0, . . . n− 1, 0 ≤ timin < timax.
Let d = <a0, [t
0
min, t
0
max), a1, [t
1
min, t
1
max), . . . an−1, [t
n−1
min, t
n−1
max), an> be
an (a, L) spy sequence of length n for P and ω be an (I, P ) sequence for P .
We write d ≤ ω iﬀ for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, ω(Fω(i)) = ai and for all 0 ≤ i < n,
timin ≤ Fω(i+ 1)− Fω(i) < timax.
Let d be an (a, L) spy sequence of length n for P , 0 ≤ i < n and a ∈ H.
The No-privacy property NPr(d, i, a) for P is deﬁned as follows. Property
NPr(d, i, a) holds iﬀ for each (I, P ) sequence ω for P , if d ≤ ω then a ∈
{ω(Fω(i) + 1), . . . , ω(Fω(i+ 1)− 1)}.
3.3 SMV Model
In this section we describe how SMV can be used to check No-privacy.
Fig. 3 gives a list of the variables used together with their (ﬁnite) ranges.
Keyword DEFINE in Fig. 3 is used to deﬁne constants as well as to assign
names to expressions.
Figs. 2, 4, 5 give, respectively, our SMV model for the cache process (Ac)
in Fig. 1, the user process (Au) in Fig. 1, the web process (Aw) in Fig. 1.
We check the No-privacy property using an observer process. Essentially
our observer checks that the No-privacy property holds along a given compu-
tation path. That is the observer checks that on a given computation sequence
satisfying our temporal constraints (i.e. the given spy sequence) the high ac-
tion a w occurs where (w.r.t. low actions) and when (w.r.t. time constraints)
we required. This is easily done by implementing our No-privacy deﬁnition
in section 3.2 with a process that we call observer. Our SMV model for the
observer process is given in Fig. 6.
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MODULE main
VAR
Au : 1 .. 7; -- user state
Ac : 1 .. 2; -- cache state
Aw : 1 .. 2; -- web state
z : 0 .. 7; -- user timer (Au)
x : 0 .. 7; -- cache timer (Ac)
y : 0 .. 255; -- web timer Aw
act : {a_e, r_e, a_c, r_c, a_w, r_w, nop}; -- req/ack action set
seen : boolean; -- 1 only after action a_w has been seen
obs : -1 .. 4;
t : 0 .. 255;
DEFINE
H := {a_c, r_c, a_w, r_w, nop}; -- high actions
L := {a_e, r_e}; -- low action
D2_min := 18;
D2_max := 22;
D3_min := 13;
D3_max := 220;
Fig. 3. State variables and their ranges
-- USER
INIT
(Au = 1) & (act = nop) & (z = 0)
TRANS
((Au = 1) & (next(Au) = 1) & (next(act) = nop) & (next(z) = 0)) | -- idle
((Au = 1) & (next(Au) = 2) & (next(act) = r_e) & (next(z) = 0)) |
((Au = 2) & (next(Au) = 2) & (next(act) = nop) & (next(z) = 0)) | -- idle
((Au = 2) & (next(Au) = 4) & (next(act) = a_e) & (next(z) = 0)) |
((Au = 4) & (z < 2) & (next(Au) = 4) & (next(act) = nop) &
(next(z) = z + 1)) |
((Au = 4) & (z >= 1) & (next(Au) = 3) & (next(act) = r_c) &
(next(z) = 0)) |
((Au = 4) & (z >= 1) & (next(Au) = 5) & (next(act) = r_w) &
(next(z) = 0)) |
((Au = 3) & (act = r_c) & (next(Au) = 3) & (next(z) = 0)) |
((Au = 3) & (act = nop) & (next(Au) = 3) & (next(z) = 0)) | -- idle
((Au = 3) & (act = a_c) & (next(Au) = 7) & (next(act) = nop) &
(next(z) = 0)) |
((Au = 5) & (act = r_w) & (next(Au) = 5) & (next(z) = 0)) | -- idle
((Au = 5) & (act = nop) & (next(Au) = 5) & (next(z) = 0)) | -- idle
((Au = 5) & (act = a_w) & (next(Au) = 7) & (next(act) = nop) &
(next(z) = 0)) |
((Au = 7) & (next(Au) = 7) & (z < 2) & (next(act) = nop) &
(next(z) = z + 1)) |
((Au = 7) & (next(Au) = 6) & (z >= 1) & (next(act) = r_e) &
(next(z) = 0)) |
((Au = 6) & (next(Au) = 6) & (next(act) = nop) & (next(z) = 0)) | -- idle
((Au = 6) & (next(Au) = 1) & (next(act) = a_e) & (next(z) = 0))
Fig. 4. User automaton
SMV keyword SPEC is followed by a formula describing the property to be
veriﬁed. In our case the property we want to verify is that along all computa-
tion paths (AG in SMV parlance) the No-privacy property holds. This indeed
amounts to check the No-privacy property NPr as deﬁned in section 3.2. Our
speciﬁcation is given in Fig. 7.
Note that since SMV semantics is synchronous as a matter of fact all INIT
expressions are put in logical “and”. The same holds for TRANS expressions.
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-- Web
INIT
Aw = 1 & y = 0
TRANS
((Aw = 1) & !(act = r_w) & (next(Aw) = 1) & (next(y) = 0)) |
((Aw = 1) & (act = r_w) & (next(Aw) = 2) & (next(act) = nop) &
(next(y) = 1)) |
((Aw = 2) & (act = nop) & (y < 250) & (next(Aw) = 2) & (next(act) = nop) &
(next(y) = y + 1)) |
((Aw = 2) & (act = nop) & (y >= 100) & (next(Aw) = 1) &
(next(act) = a_w) &(next(y) = 0))
Fig. 5. Web automaton
-- Obs
INIT
obs = 0 & t = 0 & seen = 0
TRANS
-- fail state used when spy sequence (d) not found ------------------
((obs = -1) & (next(obs) = obs) & (next(t) = 0) &
(next(seen) = seen)) | -- obs fail state
((obs = 0) & (act = nop) & (next(obs) = obs) & (next(t) = 0) &
(next(seen) = seen)) | -- idling on nop init state
-- handling r_e ------------------------------------------------------
((obs = 0) & (act = r_e) & (next(obs) = 1) & (next(t) = 0) &
(next(seen) = seen)) | -- seen r_e
-- handling H* a_e ---------------------------------------------------
((obs = 1) & (act in H) & (t < D2_max) & (next(obs) = 1) &
(next(t) = t + 1) & (next(seen) = seen)) | -- seen H*
((obs = 1) & (act = a_e) & (D2_min <= t) & (t < D2_max) &
(next(obs) = 2)&(next(t) = 0)&(next(seen) = seen)) | -- seen H* a_e
((obs = 1) & !((act in H)|(act = a_e)) & (t < D2_max) &
(next(obs) = -1) & (next(t) = 0) & (next(seen) = seen)) | -- fail
((obs = 1)&(t >= D2_max)&(next(obs) = -1)&(next(t) = 0) ) | -- too late
((obs = 1) & (act = a_e) & (t < D2_min) & (next(obs) = -1) &
(next(t) = 0) & (next(seen) = seen)) | -- too soon
-- handling H* (a_w) r_e, no reset of t after a_w -------------------
((obs = 2) & (act in H) & (act != a_w) & (t < D3_max) &
(next(obs) = obs)&(next(t) = t + 1)&(next(seen) = seen)) | --seen H*
((obs = 2) & (act = a_w) & (t < D3_max) & (next(obs) = obs) &
(next(t) = t + 1) & (next(seen) = 1)) | -- seen H*
((obs = 2) & (act = r_e) & (D3_min <= t) & (t < D3_max) &
(next(obs) = 4)&(next(t) = 0)&(next(seen) = seen)) | -- seen H* r_e
((obs = 2) & (act = r_e) & (t < D3_min) & (next(obs) = -1) &
(next(t) = 0) & (next(seen) = seen)) | -- too soon
((obs = 2) & !((act in H)|(act = r_e)) & (t < D3_max) &
(next(obs) = -1) & (next(t) = 0) & (next(seen) = seen)) | -- fail
((obs = 2) & (t >= D3_max) & (next(obs) = -1) & (next(t) = 0) &
(next(seen) = seen)) | -- too late
((obs = 4) & (next(obs) = obs) & (next(t) = 0) &
(next(seen) = seen)) -- final state
Fig. 6. Observer automaton
-- Npr({r_e, [18, 20), a_e, [180, 220), r_e}, 2, a_w)
SPEC
AG (obs = 4 -> seen = 1)
Fig. 7. SMV speciﬁcation
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-- Log with D3_min = 13
Iteration 0: Early evaluation of specifications
-- specification AG (obs = 4 -> seen = 1) is true
Iteration 1: Early evaluation of specifications
-- specification AG (obs = 4 -> seen = 1) is true
..........................
Iteration 381: Early evaluation of specifications
-- specification AG (obs = 4 -> seen = 1) is true
The verification is complete.
resources used:
user time: 2.51 s, system time: 0.04 s
BDD nodes allocated: 64184
Bytes allocated: 2293760
BDD nodes representing transition relation: 776 + 10
Fig. 8. A glimpse of the SMV output when the No-privacy Property holds
However for clarity we kept the description of processes separated.
The actual SMV code is obtained by concatenating Figs. 3, 4, 2, 5, 6, 7.
Fig. 8 sketches SMV output for our SMV program. In this case the
property is veriﬁed.
Changing the value of D3 min in Fig. 3 to “D3 min := 12” the No-privacy
Property does not hold any longer. The results of running SMV in this case are
sketched in Fig. 9 where a counter example is given. Intuitively, by making
the temporal window too large we weaken our constraints and thus we are
no longer able to guarantee that on all computation sequences satisfying our
temporal constraints the high action a w occurs as we expect.
4 The tSPA process algebra approach
4.1 A simple model for describing real-time systems
In this section, we introduce the Timed Security Process Algebra [6] (tSPA).
Our time modeling approach is fairly simple: there is one special tick action
to represent the elapsing of time while all the other actions are durationless 2 .
This is reasonable if we choose a time unit such that the actual time of an
action is negligible w.r.t. the time unit. A global clock is supposed to be
updated whenever all the processes of the system agree on this, by globally
synchronizing on action tick. Hence, the computation proceeds in lock-steps:
between the two global synchronizations on action tick (that represents the
elapsing of one time unit), all the processes proceed asynchronously by per-
forming durationless actions. Moreover, another feature of the tSPA is the
so-called maximal progress assumption according to which tick actions have
2 These are the features of the so-called fictitious clock approach
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-- Log with D3_min = 12
Iteration 0: Early evaluation of specifications
-- specification AG (obs = 4 -> seen = 1) is true
.............................
Iteration 33: Early evaluation of specifications
-- specification AG (obs = 4 -> seen = 1) is true
Iteration 34: Early evaluation of specifications
-- specification AG (obs = 4 -> seen = 1) is false
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence
state 1.1:
D3_max = 220
D3_min = 12
D2_max = 22
D2_min = 18
L = a_e,r_e
H = a_c,r_c,
a_w,r_w,nop
Au = 1
Ac = 1
Aw = 1
z = 0
x = 0
y = 0
act = nop
seen = 0
obs = 0
t = 0
state 1.2:
Au = 2
act = r_e
state 1.3:
act = nop
obs = 1
state 1.4:
t = 1
state 1.5:
t = 2
state 1.6:
t = 3
state 1.7:
t = 4
state 1.8:
t = 5
state 1.9:
t = 6
state 1.10:
t = 7
state 1.11:
t = 8
state 1.12:
t = 9
state 1.13:
t = 10
state 1.14:
t = 11
state 1.15:
t = 12
state 1.16:
t = 13
state 1.17:
t = 14
state 1.18:
t = 15
state 1.19:
t = 16
state 1.20:
t = 17
state 1.21:
Au = 4
act = a_e
t = 18
state 1.22:
z = 1
act = nop
obs = 2
t = 0
state 1.23:
z = 2
t = 1
state 1.24:
Au = 3
z = 0
act = r_c
t = 2
state 1.25:
Ac = 2
x = 1
act = nop
t = 3
state 1.26:
x = 2
t = 4
state 1.27:
x = 3
t = 5
state 1.28:
x = 4
t = 6
state 1.29:
x = 5
t = 7
state 1.30:
Ac = 1
x = 0
act = a_c
t = 8
state 1.31:
Au = 7
act = nop
t = 9
state 1.32:
z = 1
t = 10
state 1.33:
z = 2
t = 11
state 1.34:
Au = 6
z = 0
act = r_e
t = 12
state 1.35:
Au = 1
act = a_e
obs = 4
t = 0
No more specifications left.
resources used:
user time: 0.88 s, system time: 0.05 s
BDD nodes allocated: 18427
Bytes allocated: 1638400
BDD nodes representing transition relation: 758 + 10
Fig. 9. A glimpse of SMV output when the No-privacy Property does not hold
lower priority w.r.t. internal τ actions: a communication (or an internal ac-
tivity τ) prevents time from occurring, hence the clock synchronization on
tick takes place only when all local processes have completed the execution
of all the possible communications in that round. Finally, tSPA oﬀers a con-
struct, called the idling operator, for delaying the execution of the currently
executable actions of its argument process.
We formally introduce the syntax and semantics of our timed language
tSPA. We have a set L, ranged over by l, of visible actions. L is I ∪ O
where I = {a, b, c . . .} is the set of input action and O = {a, b, c, . . .} of output
actions. A special action τ models an internal computation, i.e. it is not
visible by an external observer. We also have a complementation function
(−) : L → L, such that ∀l ∈ L : l = l. To reﬂect diﬀerent levels of secrecy
the set L of visible actions is partitioned into two sets ActH (or simply H)
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α.E
α−→ E
E1
a−→ E′1
E1 + E2
a−→ E′1
E2
a−→ E′2
E1 + E2
a−→ E′2
E1
tick−→ E′1 E2
tick−→ E′2
E1 + E2
tick−→ E′1 + E′2
E1
a−→ E′1
E1‖E2 a−→ E′1‖E2
E2
a−→ E′2
E1‖E2 a−→ E1‖E′2
E1
l→ E′1 E2
l→ E′2
E1‖E2 τ→ E′1‖E′2
E1
tick−→ E′1 E2
tick−→ E′2 ∀l ∈ L ¬(E1
l−→ ∧E2 l−→)
E1‖E2 tick−→ E′1‖E′2
Z = E E
α−→ E′
Z
α−→ E′
E1
α−→ E′1
E1\F α−→ E′1\F
(α ∈F∪F )
E tick−→ E  τ−→
ι(E)
tick−→ ι(E)
E
tick−→ E′
ι(E)
tick−→ ι(E′)
E
a−→ E′
ι(E)
a−→ E′
Fig. 10. Operational semantics for timed SPA, where l ranges over L, a ranges over
L ∪ {τ} and α over Act.
and ActL, closed by complementation function. Let tick be the special action
used to model time elapsing and let Act = L ∪ {τ} ∪ {tick}, ranged over by
α, β, . . ., while L ∪ {τ} is ranged over by a, b . . ..
The syntax for tSPA terms is the following:
E ::= 0| α.E | E1 + E2 | E1‖E2 | E\F | ι(E) | Z
where α ∈ Act, F ⊆ L and Z is a process constant that must be associated
with a deﬁnition Z = E. (As usual we assume that constants are guarded,
i.e. they must be in the scope of some preﬁx operator α.E′.)
The formal behaviour of Timed SPA terms is described by means of the
labelled transition system (lts, for short) < Proct, Act, { α−→}α∈Act >, where
α−→α∈Act is the least relation between Timed SPA terms induced by axioms and
inference rules of Figure 10. Let us consider the following relations between
SPA terms: E
τ
=⇒ E ′ (or E =⇒ E ′) if E τ−→∗ E ′, and for α = τ , E α=⇒ E ′
if E
τ−→∗ α−→ τ−→∗ E ′ (where τ−→∗ is the reﬂexive and transitive closure of
the
τ−→ relation). Let Der(E) be the set of derivatives of E, i.e. the set of
processes that can be reached through the transition relations. Let Sort(E) =
{α|α ∈ Act, ∃E ′∈ Der(E),E ′ α−→}.
The equivalence relation we consider is the timed version of observation
equivalence. This equivalence permits to abstract, to some extent, from the
internal behaviour of the systems, represented by the internal actions.
A relation R ⊆ Proct × Proct is a timed weak simulation iﬀ for every
(p, q) ∈ R we have:
• if p a−→ p′ then there exists q′ s.t. q a=⇒ q′ and (p′, q′) ∈ R,
• if p tick−→ p′ then there exists q′ s.t. q tick=⇒ q′ and (p′, q′) ∈ R.
A timed weak bisimulation is a relation R s.t. both R and R−1 are timed
weak simulations. We represent with ≈t the union of all the timed weak
bisimulations.
Example 4.1 We may easily model time-out constructs in tSPA. Assume
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t1 ≤ t2 and deﬁne a process
Time out(t1, t2, A,B) = tick
t1 .ι(A) + tickt2.τ.B
which may decide to act as the process A only for a certain amount of time,
say between t1 and t2 units of time, and that after the elapsing of t2 units of
time, if no choice has been previously performed, it behaves as B.
In fact, by looking at the semantics rules, we see that Time out(t1, t2, A,B)
may perform a sequence of t1 tick actions. Then, the system may perform
other t2 − t1 tick, unless A resolves the choice by performing an action. Pos-
sibly, after t2 units of time, through the τ action the process is forced to act
as B.
4.2 Security properties in a real-time setting
In this section we present some information ﬂow security properties, e.g. see
[6]. In particular, these are the rephrasing in a real-time setting of the non
interference theory proposed in [5].
The central property is the so called Non deducibility on Composition
(NDC , for short). Its underlying idea is that the low level view of the system
behaviour must be invariant w.r.t. the composition of the system with any
high user. This means that the low level users cannot tell anything about the
high level activity since, for them, the system is always the same. Indeed, there
is no possibility of establishing a communication (i.e. sending information).
Let E tH be the set of all potential high level users, i.e. processes E s.t.
sort(E) ⊆ H ∪{tick}∪ {τ} 3 . Then, timed Bisimulation Non-Deducibility on
Compositions (tBNDC for short) is deﬁned as follows:
E ∈ tBNDC if and only if ∀Π ∈ E tH we have (E‖Π)\H ≈t E\H.
Due to the presence of the universal quantiﬁcation tBNDC is not very easy
to be checked. Thus, other properties which can be checked more eﬃciently
have been deﬁned in our real-time setting (see [6]). Here, we present only the
tBSNNI property which is an approximation of tBNDC, since only one high
level process is considered. This process is the so called ToptickH , i.e:
ToptickH =
∑
a∈H∪H
a.ToptickH
Note that this property can be checked in polynomial time in the size of ﬁnite
systems E.
3 Actually, the deﬁnition of EtH is slightly more complex. We refer the interested reader to
[6] for a full discussion.
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4.3 An example
We formalize in our framework the example of [3]. This shows how some
information in the cache of web browsers might be leaked to the external
world. In particular, it could be possible to detect whether or not a web
browser has recently accessed a particular web page. In this context, the
high level component is the cache. The low level processes must not deduce
anything about the cache. Thus, the low level view of the system must be the
same for whatever cache is present. Unfortunately, this is not the case.
Consider the following description of the system under investigation:
B = ι(re.ι(ae.T ime out(1, 2, Cache,Web)))
Cache = cachedw.B
Web = Time out(100, 250, B,B)
The system B works as follows. We assume that there is an applet in the
system which requests the web page. The system allows the applet to per-
form a request (denoted by the action re) to a site e, which may answer, by
performing action ae. Then, the applet requests a particular web page w, i.e.
the web page it wants to know whether or not it is in the cache. We have two
diﬀerent possibilities depending on the presence of this page in the cache. If
so, the system may again perform a request to the site e, in at most 2 units
of time; otherwise, the system will access the web and the request to the web
site e cannot be performed before 100 units of time. Therefore, we can simply
check that the cache may be exploited to leak some information since the low
level view of the system depends on the status of the cache.
Let the set of high actions H be {cachedw}. We can show that B \H ≈t
(B‖ToptickH ) \H.
In particular, note that (B‖ToptickH ) \ H) re=⇒ ae=⇒ tick=⇒ re=⇒, while B \ H is
not able to perform such a computation. As a matter of fact, B \H represents
a system where no cachedw action is possible. This models an empty cache.
While (B‖ToptickH ) represents a system whose cache has the page w, since
ToptickH is able to perform cachedw. Indeed, we have that B is not tBSNNI
and consequently that B is not tBNDC.
5 Conclusions
We have analyzed a time-dependent web attack with three diﬀerent approaches.
All of them are able to detect the attack.
The three approaches adopt diﬀerent communication models: HL-Timed
Automata and SMV assume synchronous parallel composition, tSPA Process
Algebra assumes asynchronous parallel composition plus synchronous com-
munication. To describe processes on the network the asynchronous parallel
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composition is more natural, and moreover tSPA has ad hoc constructs for
the purpose. On the other hand, HL-Timed Automata and SVM permit to
describe the communication structure. To prove properties, in all the ap-
proaches, one must consider a sequential version of the system, and the cost
of this reduction is exponential size on the number of components.
The three approaches consider three diﬀerent time models. In HL-Timed
Automata one has dense time domain and clocks which can be reset, SVM
is a discrete time version of HL-Timed Automata, and tSPA has a discrete
time domain and a tick transition. On the one hand, tSPA and SVM have the
same time-expressiveness, but SVM is more succinct with respect to tSPA. In
fact to simulate n discrete clocks a process in tSPA must be exponential on n.
On the other hand HL-Timed Automata model is more time-expressive than
SVM and tSPA. Now, in the framework of networks sometimes the discrete
time approximation is too restrictive and one needs dense time, even though
the cost to verify the property becomes Cn ·n!, where n is the number of clocks
and C the maximum constant that appears in the automaton.
We observe also that in tSPA we have considered a non interference prop-
erty, namely timed bisimulation non deducibility on composition. Its underly-
ing idea is that no high level activity can be detected by only observing the low
level behavior. The notion of observation is characterized through a process
equivalence. The non interference property is based on the fact that the sys-
tem can be composed with processes that are able to synchronize with its high
and low actions. On the contrary, in the case of both HL-Timed Automata
and SMV we have considered a diﬀerent non interference property, which is
based on the fact that the system can be composed with an environment that
is able to synchronize only with its low actions.
The tBNDC property considered by tSPA seems to be more restrictive than
the No-privacy Property deﬁned for HL-Timed Automata and SVM, and so it
might be used to discover other kinds of attack with respect to the No-privacy
Property. On the other hand, since this property is more selective, it could
be possible to deﬁne with it more ﬂexible information ﬂow properties for the
systems under investigation.
We note that although the formal frames of the three approaches pre-
sented here appear to be quite diﬀerent, as a matter of fact the formalization
eﬀort (i.e. the time needed to deﬁne the model to be analyzed) seems to be
essentially the same for all the three approaches.
Finally, we note that it was not the goal of this paper to address scalability
issues.
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